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## POLITICS

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### Poisoning SALT

WHEN SENATOR HENRY Jackson (D-Wash.) told a Houston audience on March 9 that he might not vote for SALT II because the loss of top-secret U.S. monitoring stations in Iran crippled the ability to verify Soviet compliance with the pact, he struck a blow at the soft underbelly of the negotiations. A poll published in *Public Opinion* magazine, for example, had shown that the major factor in a citizen's decision on whether or not to support SALT II was whether or not he or she trusted the government "to negotiate and enforce a treaty in the best interests of the U.S." (Emphasis added.) This recognition of the crucial role of verification to the success of the treaty led Carter last year to publicly admit, for the first time, the existence of U.S. spy satellites.

An administration official replied to Jackson in the *Washington Post*, charging that the senator's assertions were "premature and alarmist." As the President himself had said, there were many other methods of verification.

But over the past six months, a flood of espionage cases, books, and articles, often with sensitive, inside information (the release of which does not seem to trouble the Justice Department), has undermined such assurances, particularly in regard to the value of U. S. spy satellite systems. These disclosures come at a time when public opinion on foreign policy issues has become confused by right-wing charges that the Soviet Union has taken advantage of Carter's indecisiveness to make gains throughout Asia and Africa. The atmosphere is ripe for a new round of scapegoating. Are hidden scriptwriters at work, fashioning unanswerable

charges of Soviet "moles" burrowing into the top echelons of the CIA, using those charges as blunt instruments to forge a new and aggressively anticommunist foreign policy consensus?

That would appear to be the case, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) appear to be the immediate target.

LAST NOVEMBER, A U. S. attorney was moved to remind the jury in the espionage case of William P. Kampiles that it was the defendant who was on trial, not the Central Intelligence Agency. Kampiles, apparently a disgruntled CIA watch officer, had been arrested in August for selling a supersecret KH-11 spy satellite manual to the KGB. Testimony during the trial established that seventeen other KH-11 manuals were missing as well, and that the FBI had been investigating the "possible compromise" of the system two and a half months before it got onto the trail of Kampiles. Questions of whether Kampiles had been the "fall guy" in a complicated KGB operation soon floated to the surface.

Michael Ledeen, executive editor of the *Washington Quarterly*, which reflects the views of its sponsor, the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Affairs, offered this view: "[T]he best-informed people in this field—including more than one former CIA director—are privately saying that the responsibility . . . may arise more from the activities of a 'mole' than from incidents related by a slim thread of chance."

One former CIA director, Richard Helms, was more explicit. According to the *Washington Post*, he said, "The Kampiles case raises the question of whether or not there has been infiltration of the U.S. intelligence community or government at a significant level."

Ledeen found a culprit. He pointed out—correctly—that the best way to protect against "moles" is to maintain strict compartmentalization of information, operations, and personnel. "Yet," he charged, "Colby eliminated much of this compartmentalization."

Ledeen's account came across as authoritative and persuasive, thanks

to his apparent access to a highly sensitive account of a CIA counterintelligence operation designed to trap the alleged mole. But in furnishing a gratuitous and unsubstantiated version of Colby's directorship of the CIA (after all, a Republican hawk, George Bush, and an admiral, Stansfield Turner, had followed Colby), Ledeen had tipped his hand as to his own sources.

"I am not a mole," Colby began in deadpan around the Washington dinner-party circuit.

On September 24, meanwhile, one John A. Paisley, an ostensibly retired senior CIA analyst of Soviet missile capabilities who had been in on developing the spy satellite, wrapped himself in weights, fired a bullet into his head, and rolled off the deck of his sloop into the chilly waters of the Chesapeake Bay. That was the official version. Evasions and half-truths by CIA spokesmen, however, provoked one reporter, Joe Trento of the *Wilmingon (Del.) News Journal*, to speculate in print weeks later that John A. Paisley might "reappear in Moscow at this year's annual May Day parade in Red Square."

It turned out, for example, that Paisley had not exactly "retired from the agency in 1974 as deputy director of the Office of Strategic Research," as CIA spokesman Herbert E. Hetu stated. Paisley had continued to work with the CIA as a consultant, notably as coordinator of the "B Team," the experts who reviewed top secret CIA intelligence on Soviet nuclear capabilities. CIA security officers removed highly classified papers relating to the arms talks from Paisley's boat and apartment (in a building that housed several Soviet diplomats) when it was discovered he was missing. And according to one witness, the sloop had been full of sophisticated radio gear.

Remarkably, the CIA later stated that it had routinely destroyed Paisley's fingerprints in an "office reorganization" following his official retirement. Paisley's dentist said he "eyeballed" plates from a rotting, bloated corpse recovered from the Chesapeake to identify them as Paisley's. The hands were severed before cremation. His wife Maryanne Paisley never saw the body. Could Paisley have defected, Trento and others ask, taking with him vital intelligence secrets and leav-

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ing only a fake corpse behind? Senate Intelligence Committee thought its own inquiry raised enough unanswered questions for the case to go to the Justice Department.

Perhaps it is only a coincidence, but Trento's account of the Paisley mystery, as rendered in the March issue of *Penthouse*, ultimately resurrects old questions about William Colby's handling of the CIA. John Paisley reportedly began a cruise to the Caribbean with Maryanne on their sloop soon after his retirement in 1974. On the way, they docked for a while at the Mason Marina in Wilmington, N. C., at the "same time" a KGB defector named Yuri Nosenko was there.

**T**HE NOSENKO AFFAIR AND the feuding it provoked between Colby and the CIA's counterintelligence czar James Angleton lie at the heart of the recent wave of spy stories and "mole" theories. According to Edward Jay Epstein's book *Legend*, which relied heavily on Angleton's cooperation, Nosenko ostensibly defected from the KGB in 1964 with the story that Lee Harvey Oswald had not been a Soviet operative. Believing it was a cover story, Angleton dismissed Nosenko as a KGB "disinformation" plant. For the next four years, while Nosenko was continuously and mercilessly interrogated, CIA operatives and officials hotly debated his credibility. In 1968, without any resolution of the dispute, Nosenko was given a CIA stipend, a new identity, and a new home in North Carolina. Finally, in 1975, William Colby "rehabilitated" the Russian and brought him back to Washington. According to some reports, he is now actively handling assignments on Soviet intelligence for the CIA.

A "former operations chief of the CIA's counterintelligence," writing alongside an interview with Epstein in *New York* magazine, decried Nosenko's new lease on life. "Acceptance of Nosenko," he wrote, "throws the entire perspective about Soviet intelligence out of focus. His information tells us things the present devotees of détente want to hear and cumulatively degrades our knowledge (and the sources of this knowledge) of Soviet intelligence capabilities, policies, and effectiveness." His conclusion: "... William Colby virtually destroyed ci [counterintelligence] in the CIA."

Angleton had reason to be bitter. Colby had fired him late in December 1974, immediately following Seymour Hersh's exposé of CIA domestic spying programs in the *New York Times*. As counterintelligence chief, Angleton had been in charge of the mail cover and surveillance programs; thus, his responsibility for them and his firing were linked publicly. Close observers soon learned otherwise: that Angleton's removal had more to do with fundamental policy disputes with Colby.

Suspicious of détente as a gargantuan Soviet plot, and convinced that the antiwar movement was directed from Moscow, Angleton was among the most recalcitrant of Cold Warriors. Inside the agency, Russian defectors were but shadows in his special, subterranean world; nothing could be what it initially seemed to be.

When he became CIA director in 1973, Colby pressed for a more open, risk-taking intelligence service, but Angleton dug in his heels. By the time he was fired, Angleton believed Western defenses were about to be stripped. When Colby delivered the "family jewels"—the internal secrets of CIA crimes—to the Church committee and the Rockefeller commission, Angleton was convinced that the agency was being wrecked from within.

**F**OR THE PAST TWO YEARS, Angleton's prints have been all over a series of published attacks on Colby as well as on interpretations of a recent series of dramatic espionage cases. In normal times, a private feud between two retired CIA officials, each relying on indirection and leaks, would seem to amount to hardly more than an arcane, if titillating, bureaucratic struggle. But in the context of the Kampiles and Paisley cases, unresolved charges of KGB infiltration of America's intelligence community lend ammunition to critics of détente.

From all indications, verification of Russian capabilities will be the focal point for the right-wing attack on SALT in the Senate. Henry Jackson's speech is just a harbinger. The Carter administration, when push comes to shove, will have to somehow "prove" that it can effectively monitor Soviet performance.

And this is exactly why the continuing series of spy stories and "mole wars" can so effectively undermine

public support of U.S. arms reductions in particular and détente in general. Why is it, after all, that *New York* magazine, usually devoted to the latest wrinkle in disco dining, has become the arena for what would seem to be a public laundering of ultrasensitive charges about Russian spies in the government? Was this the 1978 version of Joe McCarthy's bombshell in Wheeling, West Virginia?

The attacks are likely to be troublesome for the Carter administration. No sensible CIA director will unequivocally report that there is *no* KGB penetration of the CIA. Likewise, the Carter administration will be hard pressed to present a detailed defense of its spy satellite systems without risking compromise of real secrets.

Wisconsin Democrat Les Aspin, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee's subcommittee on oversight, notes that "charges that the Russians will seek to evade [SALT II's] provisions are beginning to be heard." But in a comprehensive article in the February *Scientific American*, Aspin challenges the doomsayers on the alleged KH-11 compromise:

"... The introduction of a new strategic weapon involves at least five stages: research, development, testing, production and deployment. . . .

"Consider the ways in which the U. S. is currently able to monitor just one of these stages; the testing of strategic launchers. U. S. line-of-sight radars can identify the distinctive 'signature' of reflected microwaves associated with each major type of Russian missile. In addition, over-the-horizon radars can penetrate deep into the interior of the USSR and recognize the characteristic pattern each type of missile makes when it disturbs the earth's ionosphere. Early warning satellites, originally designed to detect a Russian ICBM attack, can also serve to monitor missile tests: the infrared sensors on the satellites can identify the rocket-exhaust plume of a missile as it is being test-fired. Finally, the U. S. has a complex array of sensors, including assorted photographic gear, on ships and planes that routinely monitor missile-test impact areas on the periphery of the USSR and in the Pacific. . . .

"In short," Aspin says, "the 'national technical means' of surveillance available to this country for observing Russian missile tests are multiple, redundant and complementary. . . .

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They are, in fact, far more reliable than most human intelligence gathering (that is, spying), which may yield second hand, dated information, or even false, planted information."

**B**UT STATE DEPARTMENT public opinion analyst Bernard Roshco laments, "The devil has the best songs and the antiarms controllers have the best oversimplifications. I'm afraid that when it comes down to the Senate, the decision will not be on the actual details of the agreement, but on the trustworthiness of the Soviet Union or the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations."

What better way to keep relations between the contending superpowers off balance than stirring up public hysteria over an alleged "mole"?

Not far up the road from where Chain Bridge reaches across the Potomac River from Washington into northern Virginia is the modest home of James Angleton. At one end of the living room is a bookshelf that holds several rows of volumes on the art of trout fishing.

Pulling down a favorite book, on a summer evening almost two years ago, the retired spy-catcher remarked how unimportant it is, after all, to take one from the water.

"It doesn't matter whether you hook him," he explained. "It only matters, when he takes the line, even if he later drops it, that you've beaten him. And he knows he's beaten."

"That's the whole point of the game." □

*JEFF STEIN is a Washington writer who specializes in national security affairs. Portions of the interview with James Angleton appeared in the July 26, 1977 issue of the Boston Phoenix.*